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ABSTRACT
The amount of trust that can be placed in commodity com-
puting platforms is limited by the likelihood of vulnerabili-
ties in their huge software stacks. Protected-module archi-
tectures, such as Intel SGX, provide an interesting alter-
native by isolating the execution of software modules. To
minimize the amount of code that provides support for the
protected-module architecture, persistent storage of (confi-
dentiality and integrity protected) states of modules can be
delegated to the untrusted operating system. But precau-
tions should be taken to ensure state continuity: an attacker
should not be able to cause a module to use stale states (a
so-called rollback attack), and while the system is not under
attack, a module should always be able to make progress,
even when the system could crash or lose power at unex-
pected, random points in time (i.e., the system should be
crash resilient).
Providing state-continuity support is non-trivial as many
algorithms are vulnerable to attack, require on-chip non-vo-
latile memory, wear-out existing off-chip secure non-volatile
memory and/or are too slow for many applications.
We present ICE, a system and algorithm providing state-
continuity guarantees to protected modules. ICE’s novelty
lies in the facts that (1) it does not rely on secure non-volatile
storage for every state update (e.g., the slow TPM chip). (2)
ICE is a passive security measure. An attacker interrupting
the main power supply or any other source of power, can-
not break state-continuity. (3) Benchmarks show that ICE
already enables state-continuous updates almost 5x faster
than writing to TPM NVRAM. With dedicated hardware,
performance can be increased 2 orders of magnitude.
ICE’s security properties are guaranteed by means of a
machine-checked proof and a prototype implementation is
evaluated on commodity hardware.
1. INTRODUCTION
Protection of sensitive data in commodity computing plat-
forms is extremely challenging. Modern operating systems
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provide process isolation primitives, but the kernel is too
large to be implemented free from vulnerabilities. More-
over, commodity systems are prone to physical attacks, even
by ill-equipped and resource-constrained home users. These
vulnerabilities limit the amount of trust that can be placed
in commodity systems. In servers these limitations are reme-
died by programmable hardware security modules (HSMs).
On client devices, highly-sensitive applications such as on-
line banking or e-government often resort to smart cards.
Unfortunately, these solutions are expensive, cumbersome
and the security guarantees that they can provide to the
overall applications are limited.
Two recent advances in computer security indicate that
this situation may change in the near future. First, pro-
tected-module architectures (PMAs) have been developed
that provide strong isolation directly to modules running at
application level [3, 4, 16, 17, 19, 28, 29, 36]. The OS is still
relied upon to provide services such as disk and network
access, but they are not trusted. Protected modules’ mem-
ory regions cannot be accessed from unprotected memory;
modules are in complete control over their own content and
can only be accessed through the interface they expose. Last
year Intel disclosed their work on Software Guard eXtension
(SGX) [2, 9, 18], their own hardware-implemented PMA for
commodity processors. SGX goes even further than other
state-of-the-art PMAs and also provides protection against
hardware attacks; modules (called enclaves in SGX1) are
only stored in plaintext within the CPU package. When
they are evicted to main memory they are confidentiality,
integrity and version protected.
Second, Agten et al. [1] and Patrignani et al. [21,22] pro-
posed fully-abstract compilation techniques to protected-
module architectures. While the strong isolation guarantees
offered by these architectures is vital, they are difficult to
implement without compiler support. Care must be taken
not to introduce software vulnerabilities during compilation.
Fully-abstract compilation ensures just this; machine-code-
level attacks exists iff also a corresponding attack at source-
code level exists. This enables easy reasoning and verifica-
tion of the security guarantees these modules provide.
Unfortunately an important attack vector has been largely
overlooked. Protected-module architectures, including SGX,
only provide strong isolation guarantees while the system
executes continuously. Without support for state continu-
ity, protected modules need to remain stateless, significantly
1We will use the term “protected module” when referring to
isolated memory areas in any protected-module architecture
and use “enclave” when referring to SGX specifically.
hampering their applicability. Consider as a running exam-
ple a password-checking module. To defend against dictio-
nary attacks, the user will be locked out indefinitely after
three failed attempts. The module confidentiality and in-
tegrity protects its state before handing it to the untrusted
operating system for storage. But when the module needs
to recover its state after a reboot, it cannot distinguish be-
tween a fresh and a stale state and the guess-limited security
measure cannot be guaranteed.
In practice most applications and protocols rely on state-
continuity guarantees; firewall settings most not be revert-
ible, attackers must not be able to tamper with log files,
revoked user credentials must not be rolled back, crypto-
graphic nonces must never be re-used, etc. Support for state
continuity may also provide stronger security guarantees.
Chun et al. for example proposed append-only memory [5]
to harden existing distributed algorithms and applications
such as NFS. Acting as a trusted log, this memory protects
against equivocation; the ability of a network node to make
contradicting statements to different entities.
While at first glance having similarities with replay at-
tacks, the state itself is replayed in a rollback attack. Pro-
viding support for state continuity is therefore much harder,
especially when practical limitations are considered. Parno
et al. [20] show that many seemingly obvious algorithms are
flawed. Others are prone to simple hardware attacks. At-
taching an uninterruptible power source (UPS), for exam-
ple, may simply be disconnected. Or an in-kernel attacker
may prevent the execution of the interrupt handlers it re-
lies upon. Adding non-volatile memory on-chip could sim-
plify a solution, but requires modification of manufacturing
processes leading to increased manufacturing costs. Alter-
natively, using non-volatile memory off-chip (e.g., isolating
disk space) may be susceptible to a clone attack where a
hardware-level attacker may easily overwrite the state with
a previously recorded stale state. Using TPM NVRAM or
TPM monotonic counters instead, would foil such attacks,
but would significantly impact performance and usability.
Most implementations only provide 1,280 bytes of NVRAM
that supports only 100,000 write cycles over the chip’s life-
time [20]. Accessing NVRAM every second, would wear it
out in less then 28 hours. Monotonic counters, on the other
hand, only need to be incrementable every 5 seconds [35].
Hardware upgrades to the TPM chip could reduce some of
these architectural constraints, at an economic cost. How-
ever, any solution placing the TPM on the performance-
critical path, would require additional upgrades over time to
bridge the ever growing TPM/CPU performance gap. We
present ICE, an alternative solution that only requires TPM
accesses at boot time and is thus not affected by TPM speed.
ICE avoids architectural challenges (1) by proposing a
simple implementation technique where on-chip dedicated
registers are backed off-chip by a capacitor and persistent
memory. Upon a sudden loss of power, the contents of the
dedicated registers is written to persistent memory. (2) ICE
is a passive protection scheme; in the event of a crash or
power loss, security is guaranteed instantly. A hardware at-
tacker may disconnect the capacitor, but state continuity
remains guaranteed. (3) At the moment freshness informa-
tion is backed to persistent storage, it is considered public
data. Overwriting it with stale freshness information will be
detected upon recovery.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present ICE, the first algorithm providing state-
continuity guarantees with a minimal TCB that does
not rely on the speed of secure, non-volatile memory
(e.g., the (slow) TPM chip) nor does it rely on an
uninterruptible power source.
• We formally verify and machine check the security
properties of ICE using the Coq proof assistant.
• Because SGX-enabled machines or emulators are not
yet available, we validate our claims based on a proto-
type implementation on top of Fides [28], an existing
hypervisor-based protected module architecture simi-
lar to SGX. Benchmarks show that states can already
be stored almost 5x faster on commodity hardware
than writing to TPM NVRAM. Dedicated hardware
support would increase performance substantially.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First
we detail our attack model and the security properties that
we need to guarantee. Next in Sections 3 and 4, we present
our algorithm and discuss two possible implementations. Fi-
nally, we evaluate the security and performance of ICE.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
2.1 Attacker Model
ICE can defend against an attacker with three powerful
capabilities. First, we assume that an attacker is able to
compromise the entire software stack, with the exception of
ICE-implementing modules. This enables versatile attacks
ranging from modifying the contents of the hard drive to
preventing enclaves from ever resuming execution.
Second, we assume that an attacker has control over the
system’s power supply or is able to launch attacks leading
to a similar result. Power-interruption attacks differ from
kernel-level crashes as they also affect software modules ex-
ecuting in complete isolation from the rest of the system:
modules may stop executing before they can commit their
new state. SGX enclaves are especially vulnerable to such
attacks. In order to prevent denial-of-service attacks by ma-
licious enclaves that never return control to the kernel, SGX
supports interruption of enclaves [11]. When the interrupt
is handled in the untrusted kernel, an in-kernel attacker can
easily prevent the enclave from ever resuming execution.
Third, we consider hardware attacks. We implement ICE
as a library that modules can be statically linked with and
take advantage of the security guarantees provided by the
protected-module architecture. In case of SGX this im-
plies that an attacker may place probes on memory buses
or perform cold boot attacks [8]. Defending against phys-
ical attacks against the CPU package itself or the TPM
chip [26,32,38] are orthogonal problems and not considered.
2.2 Security Properties
State continuity can be factored into two properties: safety
and liveness. To ensure safety, ICE must be resilient against
a rollback attack where an attacker provides the module with
a valid, but stale state. A rollback attack is related to a re-
play attack but it is much harder to defend against. Where
in a replay attack identical input is provided, the state of
the module itself is replayed in a rollback attack.
The second property, liveness, states that benign events
should never force the system into a state from which it can-
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Figure 1: Architecture of guarded memory. When
power suddenly fails on-chip dedicated registers are
backed up to off-chip, shadow memory (NVRAM).
not progress. In practice this means that the system should
be allowed to crash at any time during the operation of the
algorithm, including when it is recovering from a previous
crash. Note that this is not the same as protection against
denial-of-service. Protection against denial-of-service is not
in scope; in-kernel attackers can easily prevent the system
from progressing (e.g., by breaking the kernel). Liveness
only ensures progress is not hampered by random crashes,
which may also occur when the system is not under attack.
3. STATE-CONTINUITY AS A LIBRARY
Before introducing a running example and describing ICE
in full detail, we first introduce the system hardware we rely
on and discuss how freshness information is recorded.
3.1 Architecture
Assuming ICE is implemented on top of Intel SGX, we
only place trust in the CPU package and TPM chip. Attacks
against any other component cannot compromise security.
Enclaves.
Intel SGX provides enclaves with total control over their
own code and data by enforcing a specific access control
mechanism; only when executing within the boundaries of
an enclave can its content be accessed. Access attempts
from code running at any privilege level outside the enclave
(including from other enclaves), will be blocked. Enclaves
can only be accessed through an explicitly exposed interface.
TPM.
We store long term secrets and freshness information in
TPM NVRAM. These secrets should only be accessible from
the SGX enclave that provided them.
Guarded Memory.
To enable fast state updates, we propose the addition of
a small amount of guarded memory; dedicated registers on-
chip that are backed off-chip by shadow, non-volatile mem-
ory (NVRAM) and a capacitor (see Fig. 1). When a con-
troller detects that the main power supply is disconnected
from the CPU package, it copies the registers’ content to
non-volatile memory. When power is re-applied, the regis-
ters are restored. Note that only on-chip components need
to be trusted. Attacks against shadow memory, main power
supply or the capacitor cannot break state continuity.
Persistent Storage.
ICE uses operating system services to access persistent
storage. These services are not trusted: an attacker may
copy, replace and destroy files. To differentiate between the
actual state of a module and states stored on disk, we call
the latter (ICE) cubes whenever ambiguity might arise.
3.2 Guards: Storing Freshness Info
Just as message authentication codes (MACs) can be used
to guarantee message integrity, we will use guards to prove
that a cube is fresh. Guards are 2-tuples:
guardi(n) = (Hash
i(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
guard value
, i︸︷︷︸
guard index
)
where the first element, the guard value represents the hash
value after hashing the base value i times, the guard index.
A guard is incremented by hashing the guard value and
incrementing the index:
guardi(n) = (Hash
i(n), i)
guardi+1(n) = (Hash
i+1(n), i+ 1)
Based on the construction of guards, they possess two
important properties: (1) two guards can be compared based
on the guard index:
(n, i) ≤ (m, j)⇔
{
n = m if i = j
(Hash(n), i+ 1) ≤ (m, j) if i < j
and, (2) an attacker is unable to calculate any preceding
guard as this would imply inverting the hash function.
3.3 ChkPassword: A Running Toy Example
Guaranteeing state-continuity is non-trivial and can only
be accomplished by a module provider taking the required
safety precautions. We only provide a library offering state-
continuous storage. To demonstrate the subtle vulnerabili-
ties that need to be resolved, consider as a running example
ChkPassword, a password-checking module displayed in list-
ing 1. It exposes an interface of two functions: set_passwd
that modifies the user’s password and check_passwd2 that
handles login attempts. To prevent dictionary attacks, Chk-
Password will lock out a user indefinitely after 3 incorrect
attempts. We assume that when the module is created, the
INIT function is called before any service call is handled.
When ChkPassword executes on the platform for the first
time, a default password is selected (line 7), otherwise its
previous state is restored (line 10).
To ensure state continuity, ChkPassword needs to fulfill
three requirements. First, it must protect against subtle
timing attacks. When an attacker is able to infer that the
provided password is incorrect based on timing differences
between a correct and incorrect password3, she may be able
to crash the system before the login attempt could be re-
corded. Ensuring that each execution path takes exactly
the same amount of CPU cycles is hard. Similar to Parno
et al. [20], we take a much simpler approach and store the
state with the newly provided input before it is used in any
computation. Hence, ChkPassword stores its current state
2Calling ChkPassword from unprotected memory would en-
able an attacker to intercept the provided password before
it reaches the module. Users of ChkPassword should estab-
lish a secure channel from another module before exchanging
sensitive data [2, 28]. Such considerations are out of scope.
3A similar attack exists when a (unique) callback to unpro-
tected memory is made before an undesirable state is stored.
1 s t a t i c i n t a t t e m p t s l e f t ;
s t a t i c char ∗password ;
3
void INIT ( void ) {
5 State ∗ s t a t e ;
i f ( r e t r i e v e ( &s t a t e ) == UNINITIALIZED) {
7 password = ”d e f a u l t ” ;
a t t e m p t s l e f t = 3 ;
9 } e l s e
r e s t o r e a n d r e s t a r t ( s t a t e ) ;
11 }
13 i n t ENTRY POINT check passwd ( char ∗ guess ) {
State ∗ s t a t e = new State ( ) ;
15
// s t o r e ( input , s t a t e ) tup l e
17 c o l l e c t s t a t e ( s t a t e ) ;
c o l l e c t e n t r y ( s tate , ”CHECK PASSWD” ) ;
19 c o l l e c t i n p u t ( s tate , guess ) ;
s t o r e ( s t a t e ) ;
21
// check passwd
23 i f ( a t t e m p t s l e f t > 0 &&
strcmp ( password , guess ) == 0 ) {
25 a t t e m p t s l e f t = 3 ;
re turn OK;
27 } e l s e {
a t t e m p t s l e f t = max( a t t e m pt s l e f t −1 ,0) ;
29 re turn INCORRECT;
}
31 }
33 i n t ENTRY POINT set passwd ( char ∗oldpwd ,
char ∗newpwd) { . . . }
Listing 1: ChkPassword: A running example
(the number of attempts left and the correct password) to-
gether with the provided guess (line 17-20) before checking
the provided password. An unexpected crash while the pass-
word is being verified (i.e., after line 20), will then result in
the current state being restored and execution is restarted;
another attempt is made to check the same provided pass-
word. We assume restore_and_restart restores the cur-
rent state and restarts execution of the last called entry
point (line 10). Alternatively, if the system crashed before
the input could be recorded and thus was never used in any
meaningful computation (i.e., before line 20), the provided
guess can simply be discarded.
Second, in order to guarantee that re-execution of the
same input on the same state always leads to an identi-
cal result, modules must be deterministic. This implies that
modules must consider all sources of non-determinism (e.g.,
the result of a random number generator) as input and thus
store such data before using it in any computation.
Third, an attacker must not be able to infer any value
from the size of the stored states on disk; modules must
ensure that all cubes are equal in size.
3.4 ICE Libraries
We will provide state-continuous storage in two steps. In
Section 3.4.1 we introduce libice0, a library providing sup-
port at the cost of scarce platform resources for every in-
stance. Then in Section 3.4.2, we present libicen that al-
leviates resource pressure by storing freshness information
1 void s t o r e ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
switch ( i c e . mode) {
3 case Clear :
r e turn i n i t s t a t e ( s t a t e ) ;
5 case Act ivated :
re turn updat e s t a t e ( s t a t e ) ;
7 } }
9 i n t r e t r i e v e ( State ∗∗ s t a t e ) {
switch (tpm . mode) {
11 case Clear :
r e turn UNINITIALIZED ;
13 case Act ivated :
∗ s t a t e = r e c o v e r y s t e p ( ) ;
15 re turn RECOVERED;
} }
Listing 2: libice0 relies on tpm.mode and ice.mode
to distinguish between storing an initial state,
updating a stored state and recovery
in a single, state-continuous module ice0. As all libicen
library instances connect to the same, unique ice0 instance,
a virtually unlimited number of modules is supported.
Both libice0 and libicen provide the same interface:
store(State *) and retrieve(State **). To avoid re-
peated TPM or ice0 accesses, libice0 and libicen keep
a cached copy. In order to distinguish between these copies
and explicitly state where they are stored, we will reference
them similarly to fields of a struct. For example, the en-
cryption and MAC keys stored in the TPM chip will be
referenced as tpm.keys. The variables used by the ICE
algorithm are referenced as ice.keys and so on. Besides
storing keys and the guard we also keep track of the state
of the algorithm using a mode variable. Stored inside the
TPM chip (tpm.mode), this variable indicates whether ICE
was once initiated correctly. In libice0 (ice.mode) this
variable is used to indicate whether ICE was initiated or
recovered since reboot. We assume that when a module is
resurrected after a crash, ice.mode is initialized with value
Clear. As a shorthand, we also assume that setting this
variable takes exclusive access of guarded memory. Listing 2
uses these variables to differentiate between an initial state
being stored and a state being updated. Similarly, tpm.mode
is used to determine whether a state was ever stored.
3.4.1 libice0: State-Cont. Storage for One Module
In order to provide state continuity, we must guarantee
that an attacker is not able to fabricate recorded states
(called cubes) and that no stale cubes can be provided as
being fresh. The former is trivially guaranteed by including
a message authentication code in each cube. Guaranteeing
freshness is more challenging, but as modules maintain their
state between invocations, we only need to consider power
off and reboot events. Let’s call events during such power
cycles an execution stream. An execution stream starts by
either storing an initial state of a module or when the state
of a module is recovered after a crash. It ends when the
system crashes or when it is shut down properly.
To keep track of the fresh cube, we will generate a (base)
guard when the execution stream starts and store it securely
in TPM NVRAM. For every state the module requests stor-
age of in the current execution stream, we will increment the
void i n i t s t a t e ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
2 i c e . guard = gen guard ( ) ;
i c e . keys = gen keys ( ) ;
4 hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( i c e . guard , i c e . keys ,
s t a t e ) ) ;
i c e . mode = Activated ;
6 gmem. guard = i c e . guard ;
tpm . guard = i c e . guard ;
8 tpm . keys = i c e . keys ;
tpm . mode = Activated ;
10 }
Listing 3: libice0: Storing the initial state
void updat e s t a t e ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
2 i c e . guard = ++i c e . guard ;
hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( i c e . guard , i c e . keys ,
s t a t e ) ) ;
4 gmem. guard = i c e . guard ;
}
Listing 4: libice0: Updating a state
guard and include it in the generated cube. Using guarded
memory we will ensure that only the guard included in the
last (and thus fresh) cube is leaked at the moment the sys-
tem crashes. As no preceding guards were leaked (and can-
not be calculated), it serves as a pointer to the fresh cube.
Upon recovery, knowledge of the guard4 that is stored in the
provided cube, proves that the cube is fresh.
Creation of an Initial State.
When storage of the initial state of the module is re-
quested, a new base guard and keys are generated (see list-
ing 3). Next, a new cube is constructed and written to disk.
Exclusive access of guarded memory is taken by setting the
ice.mode variable to Activated and the fresh guard is writ-
ten to guarded memory. In case exclusive access cannot be
assigned (i.e., another module already received it), the mod-
ule simply stops its execution. For clarity, such error han-
dling is not displayed. Finally the keys and guard are stored
in the TPM’s NVRAM and tpm.mode is set to Activated,
committing the start of a new execution stream.
Updating a State.
When storage of a new input-state pair is requested in the
same execution stream, the previously used guard and keys
are still stored in libice0’s memory and no TPM accesses
are required. To safely store the input-state pair, a new
cube is created with the subsequent guard and stored on
disk (listing 4). Finally the fresh guard is written to guarded
memory, committing the step.
Recovering from a Crash.
Recovering from a crash is more challenging and is per-
formed in two steps (see listing 5, error handling is omitted
for clarity). First, the last stored cube is read from disk. By
verifying three properties its freshness is ensured:
4We must also check that this guard was created during the
last execution stream as a matching guard/cube is found at
the end of every execution stream.
1 State ∗ r e c o v e r y s t e p ( ) {
Cube cube = hdd . read ( ) ;
3 i f ( i s f r e s h ( &cube ) ) {
State ∗ s t a t e = e x t r a c t ( cube , tpm . keys ) ;
5 i c e . guard = gen guard ( ) ;
i c e . keys = tpm . keys ;
7 hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( i c e . guard ,
i c e . keys , s t a t e ) ) ;
9 i c e . mode = Activated ;
gmem. guard = i c e . guard ;
11 tpm . guard = i c e . guard ;
re turn s t a t e ;
13 }
e l s e abort ( ) ;
15 }
17 bool i s f r e s h ( Cube ∗cube ) {
re turn ( check mac ( cube , tpm . keys ) &&
19 tpm . guard ≤ cube−>guard &&
gmem. guard . va lue == cube−>guard . va lue ) ;
21 }
23 bool operator≤( Guard g1 , Guard g2 ) {
whi le ( g1 . index < g2 . index ) {
25 g1 . va lue = Hash ( g1 . va lue ) ;
++g1 . index ;
27 }
re turn g1 . va lue == g2 . va lue ;
29 }
Listing 5: libice0: Recovering from a crash.
• Validity: Cubes must not have been forged. This is
ensured by the MAC stored in each cube and the ac-
companying key stored securely in the TPM (line 17).
• Correct execution stream: The cube received from the
untrusted OS must have been created during the last
execution stream. Starting each execution stream, a
new base guard is generated and stored safely in TPM
NVRAM. All guards used during this execution stream
are successors of this base guard. Hence, the cube was
created during the last execution stream iff (line 18):
tpm.guard ≤ cube.guard
• Public guard: libice0 ensures that guarded memory
always contains the same guard as the last (fresh) cube
stored on disk5, and that no preceding guards leak
or can be calculated. Hence, if the guard stored in
guarded memory matches the guard included in the
cube at hand and the two previous properties hold as
well, it is guaranteed that the cube is fresh (line 19).
In the second step the fresh state is re-stored as part of
a new execution stream: libice0’s variables are restored
from TPM NVRAM, a new base guard is generated, the
fresh state packaged in a new cube and the base guard is
written to guarded and TPM NVRAM memory. To ensure
that after an unexpected crash during the execution of this
step, recovery can be restarted, libice0 must (1) backup
the previous fresh guard before overwriting it in guarded
5There is one exception as writing cubes to disk and updat-
ing guarded memory cannot be executed atomically. This
exception is resolved later in this section.
memory. As this value is public, any persistent storage can
be used (for clarity not displayed in listing 5). (2) The new
base guard is written to TPM NVRAM as the last step.
Let’s reconsider ChkPassword and discuss how crashes are
resolved. Depending on the timing of a crash, we can dif-
ferentiate between three main situations. One, ChkPass-
word was just created and the user called set_passwd to
change the default password. This led to the execution of
_init_state but the system crashes before tpm.mode could
be set (see listing 3, line 9). When ChkPassword is re-
created, it requests its previous state (listing 1, line 6). As
tpm.mode still read Clear (listing 2, line 11), the module will
restart from its default settings. As no input was ever used,
state-continuity is guaranteed trivially.
Two, the system didn’t crash when the user modified the
module’s default password and now calls check_passwd pro-
viding "attempt1" as password. After libice0 stores a new
cube Cattempt1 on disk and updates guarded memory, the sys-
tem crashes while the password is being verified (listing 1,
line 23). The module is re-created and execution flow even-
tually executes _recovery_step (listing 5) As only a single
cube is available containing the leaked guard from guarded
memory (or a successor thereof), only cube Cattempt1 is con-
sidered fresh. After returning the stored input-state tuple in
Cattempt1, ChkPassword will restore the attempts_left and
password variables and execution is restarted with input
"attempt1" (listing 1, line 10).
Three, assume that the previous password was incorrect
and the user enters "attempt2" for her second attempt. Af-
ter storing the new cube Cattempt2 on disk, the system crashes
before the new (incremented) guard could be written to
guarded memory (listing 4, line 4). This is an interesting
point of failure as both cubes Cattempt1 as Cattempt2 can be
considered fresh6. However, recovery based on either will
preserve state continuity. This is obvious for cube Cattempt2
as this is the latest cube written to disk. Recovery from
Cattempt1, however will purge any record of the login attempt
made using "attempt2" as password. This is also safe as
it was never used in any valuable computation (instructions
after listing 1 line 24 were not executed yet). Hence, an
attacker is not able to deduce any valuable information.
3.4.2 libicen: State-Cont. Storage for n Modules
By depending on scarce resources such as TPM NVRAM
and guarded memory, libice0 can in practice only provide
state-continuous storage to a limited number of modules.
libicen will alleviate this strain by using a single, unique
ice0 module to store freshness information on behalf of
other modules. To safely exchange sensitive information be-
tween libicen and the ice0 module, inter-module commu-
nication must guarantee endpoint authentication and confi-
dentiality, integrity and freshness of messages. We will state
this explicitly by passing a module identifier to ice0 calls.
Creation of an initial state.
Similarly to libice0, an initial state of the module is
stored by generating a new guard and cryptographic keys
and writing a new cube to disk (see listing 6). Finally the
ice0 module is requested to store the keys and guard.
6The recovery step as displayed in listing 5, line 19, only
accepts cube Cattempt1 as fresh. However, an attacker in-
crementing the guard stored in guarded memory, will trick
libice0 to accept cube Cattempt2 as being fresh as well.
1 void i n i t s t e p ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
mod . guard = gen guard ( ) ;
3 mod . keys = gen keys ( ) ;
hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( mod . guard , mod . keys ,
s t a t e ) ) ;
5 mod . mode = Activated ;
i c e 0 . s t o r e ( mod . id , mod . keys , mod . guard ) ;
7 }
Listing 6: libicen: Initialization of a new module
1 void updat e s ta t e ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
++mod . guard ;
3 hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( mod . guard , mod . keys ,
s t a t e ) ) ;
i c e 0 . s t o r e ( mod . id , mod . guard ) ;
5 }
Listing 7: libicen: Updating a state
Updating a state.
To update a state, libicen writes a new cube to disk, be-
fore the updated fresh guard is stored in ice0 (see listing 7).
Recovering from a crash.
To recover from a crash, the (presumably) fresh cube is
read from disk (see listing 8). Next, the keys and guard
are requested from the ice0 module. As the fresh guard is
always stored safely in ice0, a cube with a correct MAC and
that contains the fresh guard, must be fresh. Once the cube’s
freshness has been validated, libicen needs to generate a
new guard, create and write a new cube to disk and store
the new guard in ice0 before a new step is taken. Storing
the fresh cube with a newly generated guard is vital, even
though the fresh guard never leaked. For details we refer
the reader to the extended version of this paper [27].
4. IMPLEMENTATION
Given that SGX-enabled systems are not available yet,
we implemented7 ICE on top of Fides [28], a hypervisor-
based protected-module architecture using CMOS memory
as guarded memory. This setup enables microbenchmarks
and detailed analysis of the costs of accessing the TPM chip,
writing cubes to disk, performing cryptographic calculations
and accessing guarded memory on real-life systems.
While Fides provides similar isolation mechanisms as Intel
SGX, it cannot guarantee that protected modules, or its own
implementation for that matter, do not leave the CPU pack-
age in plaintext. Hence, this setup cannot defend against a
hardware attacker that is able to directly modify contents of
main memory. Similarly, we assume that an attacker cannot
modify contents of CMOS memory directly.
While any non-volatile memory can serve as an alterna-
tive, CMOS memory is an interesting candidate for guarded
memory. As it already stores wall-clock time, it is updated
every second and it must support a large number of write
operations over its entire lifespan. Second, as it does not re-
quire a special communication protocol, it can be accessed
easily and without much overhead. Being only accessible
7Our research prototype is available at https://distrinet.
cs.kuleuven.be/software/sce/
1 State ∗ r e c o v e r y s t e p ( ) {
Cube cube = hdd . read ( ) ;
3 i c e 0 . r e t r i e v e ( mod . id , &mod . keys , &mod .
guard )
i f ( i s f r e s h ( &cube ) ) {
5 State ∗ s t a t e = e x t r a c t ( cube . s tate , tpm .
keys )
mod . guard = gen guard ( ) ;
7 hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( mod . guard , mod .
keys , cube . s t a t e ) ) ;
mod . s t a t e = Activated ;
9 i c e 0 . s t o r e (mod . id , mod . keys , mod . guard )
re turn s t a t e ;
11 }
e l s e abort ( ) ;
13 }
15 bool i s f r e s h ( Cube ∗cube ) {
re turn check mac ( cube , mod . keys ) &&
17 mod . guard . va lue == cube . guard . va lue ;
}
Listing 8: libicen: Recovering from a crash
libice0 libicen
asm C asm C
ICE 0 372 0 341
SHA-512 0 371 0 371
AES-NI 1,566 176 1,566 176
Total 1,566 919 1,566 888
Table 1: Breakdown of libice0 and libicen.
through direct I/O, it can also be isolated easily by hardware
virtualization support; only 21 lines of code (LOC) had to be
added to the hypervisor. Another 61 LOCs were required
to implement system calls to access CMOS memory from
the ice0 module. This totals the size of the hypervisor to
9,492 LOCs. While Fides at this moment does not support
TPM chip accesses, we estimate, based on the Flicker [17]
source code8, that this straightforward effort would require
an addition of less than 2,000 LOCs.
To implement libice0 and libicen, we used the polarssl9
library to calculate SHA-512 hash values and the Intel AES-
NI reference implementation to take advantage of AES hard-
ware support. This totals to 2,485 LOCs and 2,454 LOCs
for libice0 and libicen respectively (table 1).
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Security Evaluation
Recall that we wish to guarantee both safety and liveness
properties. We discuss both aspects separately.
5.1.1 Safety Properties
To ensure that our presented algorithm does guarantee
state continuity, we developed a formal proof of correct-
ness. While alternative formalizations (e.g., LS2 [6]) may
have reduced our workload, we formalized our system using
rely-guarantee reasoning [12] as it enables explicit reasoning
about attack steps. A machine-checked proof was created
8https://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/group/flicker.html
9http://polarssl.org/
using the Coq proof assistant. The proof required 118 def-
initions, 201 lemmas and totals 37,726 lines. The extended
version of this paper [27] discusses the proof in more detail.
5.1.2 Liveness Properties
In order to guarantee liveness, libice0 and libicen must
always be able to recover from a crash. We discuss how this
is accomplished during their different phases.
libice0’s liveness properties.
An important distinction can be made based on the value
of tpm.mode. This value indicates whether the algorithm has
been initialized correctly. A crash before this value is set,
will result in a re-execution of the initialization step. After
setting this value, all crashes will result in the execution
of the recovery step. To ensure that the initialization step
may succeed eventually, we store the fresh cube on disk,
take exclusive access of guarded memory, write the matching
guards to guarded and TPM NVRAM memory and store
cryptographic keys in the TPM chip before setting tpm.mode.
After initialization we may update the state or we have to
recover the fresh state. In the former case we make sure to
first store the cube before we update the content of guarded
memory. Recovery of a state is more challenging as we have
to modify the guards in both guarded and TPM NVRAM
memory. After creating a new cube with the fresh state of
the module and storing it on disk, we take exclusive access
of guarded memory and write the new guard to it before we
update TPM NVRAM memory. This has an important con-
sequence: in case the system crashes during the execution of
the recovery step before it is completed, the old guard may
have been overwritten. This would prevent the re-execution
of the recovery step. Therefore we require that this (public)
guard is written to disk before the recovery step is called.
libicen’s liveness properties.
Ensuring liveness of libicen’s algorithm is straightfor-
ward as we only have to deal with two non-volatile data
objects: cubes and the ice0 module to store freshness in-
formation. For obvious reasons we ensure that new cubes
are stored on disk first. ice0’s implementation and the li-
bice0 library it uses, guarantee that its state updates can
be considered atomically and they are always retrievable.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of our proto-
type implementation. To compare the performance impact
of a solid state drive (SSD) against a rotating hard drive
(HDD), we used two machines with comparable hardware.
The first machine, a Dell Latitude E6510, a mid-end con-
sumer laptop, is equipped with an Intel Core i5 560M pro-
cessor running at 2.67 GHz and 4 GiB of RAM. It is also
equipped with a magnetic hard disk (HDD), a Broadcom
TPMv1.2 chip and CMOS memory. The second testing lap-
top is a Dell Latitude E6520, has an Intel Core i5-2520M
CPU running at 2.50GHz and is equipped with an SSD.
Hardware Benchmarks.
To better understand the performance cost of ICE com-
pared to TPM operations, we performed 4 benchmarks on
the Latitude E6510: read/write accessing TPM NVRAM,
extending PCR registers and generating random numbers.
To perform these tests, we developed small TPM appli-
Figure 2: Microbenchmarks of various TPM oper-
ations show a significant difference in performance
cost of CMOS and disk accesses. Where applicable,
128 bytes were transferred.
cations using the TrouSerS10 open-source software stack.
We also modified the tpm tis driver to keep timing mea-
surements. Each test was run 100 times and transferred
128 bytes to/from the TPM. Figure 2 displays the median
time for each test. All operations take a significant amount
of time to complete. Especially writing to TPM NVRAM
takes 4x longer than reading from it. Related work shows
similar results for TPM chips from other vendors [20].
We also performed a similar benchmark on CMOS mem-
ory. We performed 10,000 one-byte write operations and
measured the time using the rdtscp instruction. Writing to
CMOS takes about 3µs/byte, significantly faster than writ-
ing to TPM NVRAM. We attribute this difference to the
fact that CMOS memory is connected to the SPI-bus [10]
and does not require a heavy communication protocol as
does the LPC-connected TPM chip.
Finally, we measured the median time of writing 10,000
128 bytes files to both HDD and SSD disks. As Figure 2
shows, accessing the SSD disk is 5.4 times faster than writing
to TPM NVRAM. Writing to a magnetic disk is more costly.
Microbenchmarks.
To measure the performance of both libice0 and libi-
cen libraries, we implemented two modules. The first mod-
ule implements a password verification function and lim-
its the number of attempts that can be made before the
user is locked out indefinitely. The benchmark provided
this module with 10,000 wrong password guesses and mea-
sured the median time per guess. Measurements show (see
Table 2) that for a single step only 0.06ms (0.43%) were
spent on computation when the module was linked with
the libice0 library. When we used libicen’s services, two
cubes need to be created and computation time increased to
0.13ms (0.71%). To securely write guards to CMOS mem-
ory, 0.33ms were spent (2.17% and 1.82% for libice0 and
libicen resp.). This shows a much higher cost to write
guards to CMOS compared to calculation time. But most
of the time was spent committing cubes to solid state disk
(97.40% and 97.47% for libice0 and libicen resp.). libi-
cen does not spend twice the amount of time writing cubes
to disk. Cubes only need to be committed before a guard
is incremented. Hence, libicen’s cubes can be stored tem-
porarily in memory and transferred to disk together with
ice0’s new cube without modifying the algorithm (see list-
10http://trousers.sourceforge.net/
ing 7, lines 3-4), reducing disk access times.
While most TPM chips NVRAM area is limited to 1,280
bytes [20], it could be used to provide (state-continuous)
storage to a single module to avoid disk overhead. To show
that such a module would still benefit from ICE, we imple-
mented a second benchmark called Noop. It does not per-
form any computation but only stores a state of 1,280 bytes.
As expected given the performance of SHA-512 and Intel’s
AES hardware support, the increase in computation cost is
negligibly with only 0.01ms. As cubes are still smaller than
disk sectors, costs of disk accesses are comparable to the
Password benchmark. This totals the cost of storing new
data in Noop at 15.05ms to 17.65ms for libice0 and libi-
cen resp,˙ significantly faster than 82.18ms to access TPM
NVRAM. Finally we performed these tests on the Lati-
tude E6510 which is equipped with a magnetic HDD. As
expected, the cost of writing cubes to disk increased sig-
nificantly and now accounts for 99.63%-99.74%. For both
benchmarks libicen consistently takes more time writing
cubes to disk than libice0. We attribute this behavior to
the way we implemented its write function: merging ice0’s
and libicen’s cubes takes us 3 write system calls before
system buffers are flushed.
Expected Impact of Dedicated Hardware.
These benchmarks show that only up to 0.14% of time
is spent on computation. With dedicated hardware perfor-
mance can be increased significantly.
Writing guards to CMOS memory is about 2.4 times more
costly than computation and takes up to 0.31% of the time
in case of a revolving HDD and up to 2.17% on our SSD
testing platform. Hardware support for guarded memory,
as described in detail in Section 3.1, would reduce overhead
of this operation to almost zero.
But committing cubes to disk forms the real bottleneck,
requiring up to 97.47% (for SSD) to 99.74% (for HDD) of
the time. Recently Viking Technology [34] and Micron Tech-
nology [33] announced that they will ship capacitor-backed
RAM to market. Operating similar to guarded memory,
these hardware components contain fast, volatile memory
that is written to flash memory when power is suddenly lost.
Adding these hardware components to our system would
eliminate disk access completely.
In summary, benchmarks show that our prototype im-
plementation on commodity hardware already outperforms
TPM NVRAM write operations by almost 5 times. Adding
dedicated hardware support for guarded memory and capa-
citor-backed RAM, may even enable state updates 587 times
faster than TPM NVRAM accesses!
6. RELATEDWORK
With the exception of Parno et al. [20], state-continuous
storage has largely been overlooked. Most research proto-
types rely on a huge TCB or are vulnerable to crash attacks.
Hardware Modifications.
XOM [15] protects against an attacker that is able to
snoop buses and modify memory by encrypting data and
code before it is sent to memory. While it makes it signifi-
cantly more difficult to successfully attack the system, Suh
et al. [30] argue correctly that it is vulnerable to a mem-
ory replay attack where stale memory pages are returned to
Password Noop
SSD (in ms) -lice0 -licen -lice0 -licen
computation 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.14
writing guard 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
writing cubes 14.61 17.42 14.65 17.19
total 15.00 17.87 15.05 17.65
HDD (in ms) -lice0 -licen -lice0 -licen
computation 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.13
writing guard 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
writing cubes 112.80 183.23 111.54 183.83
total 113.21 183.71 111.96 184.31
Table 2: Microbenchmarks for libice0 and libicen
the processor. Their Aegis architecture mitigates this replay
attack by storing hash trees of memory pages in a secure lo-
cation. When a memory page is loaded into the processor’s
cache, its freshness is checked by recalculating and compar-
ing the hash values. Subsequent research results also defend
against replay attacks [4, 11,37].
Memory replay attacks differ from rollback attacks in that
memory contents is replayed while the system is up and run-
ning. This enables much easier security measures.
Schellekens et al. [24] propose an embedded-systems ar-
chitecture to store a trusted module’s persistent state in
invasive-attack-resistent, non-volatile memory. Their solu-
tion implements a light-weight authenticated channel be-
tween the trusted module and non-volatile memory. Fresh-
ness of the stored data is guaranteed per read/write instruc-
tion and based on a monotonic counter. As their approach
assumes that write instructions to non-volatile memory and
increments of the monotonic counter are atomic, unexpected
loss of power enables a rollback attack. We believe that their
approach can be fixed by keeping a log of instructions in se-
cure non-volatile memory that need to be completed in case
power suddenly fails. On higher-end systems however, only
the TPM NVRAM can be used for such purposes and their
approach would lead to significant performance overhead.
ICE, in contrast, is not affected by TPM performance.
Research Systems Isolating Persistent Storage.
Many architectures rely on a large TCB that includes iso-
lation of persistent storage [7, 25, 31]. In such cases pro-
tection against rollback attacks are trivial: modules/pro-
grams can overwrite their state on disk. In practice how-
ever, software vulnerabilities in their TCB may be exploited
and state-continuity support is hard to guarantee. These
systems are also not able to defend against disk clone at-
tacks. In contrast, ICE provides strong guarantees while
only relying on a very limited TCB.
Protected-Module Architectures.
Many security architectures with minimal TCB have been
proposed that only providing strong module isolation guar-
antees [3, 11, 16, 17, 23, 28]. Persistent storage can only be
accessed via services provided by the untrusted operating
system. None of them address the issue of state continuity.
Many of these systems can be adapted to use the state-
continuity approach presented by Parno et al. [20]. This
seminal work called Memoir, is to the best of our knowl-
edge the first and only work that addresses the issue of
state continuity in protected-module architectures. Based
on Flicker [17], Memoir uses TPM NVRAM to store fresh-
ness information upon every state update. This significantly
limits the applicability of their solution as NVRAM is slow
and only required to support up to 100K writes. The au-
thors acknowledge this constrained and propose two solu-
tions: (1) adding capacitor-backed RAM to the TPM chip
and (2) Memoir-Opt, an alternative approach that stores
freshness information in (volatile) TPM PCR registers that
are written to NVRAM when power is lost unexpectedly.
Both solutions rely on an uninterruptible power source to
safely store freshness when power suddenly fails. Failure
in this mechanism can lead to a rollback attack. ICE, in
contrast, is a passive state-continuity system that does not
rely on an uninterruptible power source to guarantee secu-
rity; detaching the capacitor would only prevent stateful
modules from recovering their state but states could not
be rolled back. Moreover, in ICE the speed of updates to
state-continuous modules is only limited by the processor
and (untrusted) non-volatile memory, not by the TPM chip.
Special-Purpose Applications.
Chun et al. proposed the creation of append-only mem-
ory [5] to prevent that nodes in a distributed system can
make different statements to different nodes. An implemen-
tation with a minimal TCB was left as future work.
Levin et al. propose TrInc [14], a specialized system to
attest successive monotonic counters, to achieve similar re-
sults. TrInc assumes a dedicated device that is able to lo-
cally store attestation requests of monotonic counters. Af-
ter power was suddenly lost, clients can request the last
signed attestations. This approach is similar to solutions
were disk space is isolated, but incurs only a limited TCB.
ICE provides a more generic, low-overhead alternative with
only limited hardware modifications.
More recently Kotla et al. proposed a system [13] that
allows offline data access while guaranteeing that (1) a user
cannot deny offline accesses without failing an audit and (2)
after proving that a user did not access the data, it cannot
be accessed in the future. While their solution is interesting
and does not require any software to be trusted, it only
solves state-continuity in this specific setting.
7. CONCLUSION
Providing support for state continuity is challenging as in-
cluding non-volatile memory on-chip requires modification
of fabrication processes. But off-chip storage of freshness
information can be slow (e.g. TPM NVRAM) or vulnerable
to attack. We presented ICE, a state-continuous system and
algorithm with two important properties: (1) only at boot
time is the (slow) TPM chip accessed. State updates after
the system booted only require updates to dedicated regis-
ters backed off-chip by a capacitor and non-volatile memory.
(2) ICE is a passive security measure. An attacker interrupt-
ing the main power supply or any other source of power,
cannot break state-continuity. We believe that the impor-
tance of ICE lies in the fact that it shows that with only
limited and cheap hardware support, it enables the develop-
ment of software-only implementations of trusted computing
primitives. This presents an interesting direction for future
versions or revisions of hardware security modules (e.g., the
TPM) and may provide an interesting approach to increase
security in low-end, resource-constrained applications.
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